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INTRODUCTION 
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this symposium, con-
vened to examine Professor Wenona Singel's article, Indian Tribes and 
Human Rights Accountability. 1 Amongst her many professional accom-
plishments, Professor Singel is well known as a scholar in American Indian 
law, 2 the Chief Justice of an active tribal appellate court,3 and a Reporter on 
the American Law Institute's Restatement of American Indian Law.4 Her 
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Associate Professor of Law, and 
Director of the American Indian Law Program, University of Colorado Law School. 
1t Professor of Law; Director of the American Indian Studies Center; Director, 
MA/JD Joint Degree Program; Co-Director, Native Nations Law and Policy Center, Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles. The authors wish to thank Matthew Fletcher, Kate Fort, 
Jeffrey Same, Wenona Singe!, and the Michigan State Law Review for the opportunity to 
participate in this symposium. 
I. See Wenona T. Singe!, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 567 (2012). 
2. See Stacy L. Leeds & Elizabeth Mashie Gunsaulis, Resistance, Resilience, and 
Reconciliation: Reflections on Native American Women and the Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REv. 303, 304 n.4 (20 12) (recognizing Professor Singe! as one of the new generation of 
indigenous women scholars in legal academia). 
3. Professor Singe! is the Chief Appellate Justice of the Little Traverse Bay Bands 
of Odawa Indians. Court of General Jurisdiction (Tribal Court), LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY 
BANDS OF 0DAWA INDIANS, http://www.ltbbodawa-nsn.govffribal%20Court/ContactUs.html 
(last visited May I 3, 20 13). For opinions of the court, see Appellate Court Filing Process for 
Appeals, LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF 0DAWA INDIANS, http://www.Jtbbodawa-
nsn.gov/Tribal%20Court/Court%200pin ions/ Appellate%20Court"/o200pinions/ Appel late.ht 
ml (last visited May 13, 2013). 
4. Professor Singe! is the Co-Reporter on the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of American Indian Law. For information about the project, see Current Projects: Re-
statement Third, the Law of American Indians, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=27 (last visited May 
13, 2013). 
294 Michigan State Law Review 2013:293 
influence, therefore, is felt and respected throughout the academy, the prac-
ticing bar, and Indian country. At an early stage of her career, Professor 
Singel is already recognized as a thought-leader, someone who is both 
brave and careful in her willingness to articulate and address some of the 
most trenchant challenges in American Indian law. 
Professor Singel's newest article is perhaps the most evocative exam-
ple of her intellectual and community leadership. Her observation that Indi-
an tribes could, on occasion, do better in extending civil and human rights to 
citizens, employees, and residents in Indian country, is strikingly forthright. 
And her resulting proposal-advocating for the creation of an intertribal, 
treaty-based mechanism to adjudicate human rights disputes-is deeply 
respectful of tribal sovereignty, calling on tribes to take the first steps to-
ward increased accountability and to turn to their own laws and norms as a 
basis for improving their systems of governance. And, finally, her proposal 
is notably provocative, having inspired passionate conversations at major 
gatherings of tribal leaders and scholars across the country, 5 and a lively, 
focused discussion among Indian law scholars, lawyers, and leaders at the 
symposium on October 4-5, 2012. 6 
In this spirit, and on the occasion of this symposium, we are prompted 
first to situate Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability in the larger 
body of Professor Singel's scholarship to date, and second to describe the 
way in which she has inspired us to embark on a new research project of our 
own. 
I. PROFESSOR SINGEL'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
To use Frank Pommersheirn's words, Professor Singel does not rely 
on "received notions" of law. 7 Instead, she boldly identifies legal problems, 
brings in new conceptual and analytical tools to crack open entrenched 
thinking, and then proposes innovative solutions. Professor Singel is crea-
tive and transformative, a change agent in American Indian law. She is also 
5. Professor Singe) was invited to present Indian Tribes and Human Rights Ac-
countability to an audience of800 lawyers, scholars, and tribal leaders at a plenary session of 
the Federal Bar Association's annual Indian Law Conference on April 8, 2011. In addition, 
she has presented the work at UCLA Law School, George Mason University, the University 
of Illinois Law School, the University of Kansas, the Ford School of Public Policy, and other 
institutions. 
6. Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability Symposium-Schedule of 
Events, MICH. ST. U.C.L., http://www.law.msu.edu/tribes-accountability/schedule.htrnl (last 
visited May 13, 2013). 
7. See Frank Pommersheim, Professor, Univ. S.D. Sch. of Law, Practitioners Per-
spective and Human Rights, Presentation at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: 
Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability (Oct. 4, 2012) (recording on file with Mich-
igan State Law Review). 
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an intellectual leader who motivates fellow scholars in the field to advance 
new ground. 
The power of Professor Singel's scholarship is in its breadth of cover-
age, depth of analysis, and intellectual honesty. In each article, she identifies 
a problem in American Indian law and then employs a theoretical frame-
work-including new institutional economics, property and equity, and law 
and development-to suggest that conventional legal responses have failed 
to address the problem at hand. Having opened the door through her theory 
work, Professor Singe) then argues quite powerfully in a number of con-
texts, including labor law, commercial law, and land claims, for tribal law 
solutions to tribal law problems. 8 Consider several examples. 
Professor Singel is a well-known expert in American Indian labor rela-
tions, an area characterized by polarized viewpoints between tribal sover-
eignty advocates and labor advocates. 9 Professor Singe) bridges these posi-
tions through two works, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance (La-
bor Relations), 10 and The Institutional Economics ofTribal Labor Relations 
(Institutional Economics). 11 First, in Labor Relations she critiques the San 
Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino decision in which the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) asserted that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
implicitly subjects federally recognized tribes to the jurisdiction of the 
NLRB. 12 As Professor Singe) notes, this decision departs from the well-
established and general rule requiring Congress to be explicit when it abro-
gates tribal sovereignty, substituting instead a "confusing and subjective 
test" in which implicit divestitures will sometimes be held to abrogate sov-
ereignty. 13 
San Manuel is problematic, Professor Singe) argues, because of its de-
parture from precedent and lack of respect for the law-making institutions of 
tribes, which often have their own means for recognizing employee rights. 14 
Just as unfortunate, Professor Singe) notes, San Manuel has also led to re-
vealing problems as tribes respond to its holding. 15 It has inspired tribes to 
adopt "right-to-work" laws "to minimize the threat of unionization" and 
NLRB interference. 16 Professor Singe) comments that while this strategy 
8. See infra notes 10-11,29-30,37 and accompanying text. 
9. See. e.g., KAIGHN SMITH, JR., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 53, 63, 165 (20 II) (citing Professor Singel's works). 
10. Wenona T. Singe), Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. 
REV. 691 (2004). 
11. Wenona T. Singel, The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 487. 
12. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1055, 1059-60 (2004). 
13. Singe), supra note 10, at 691. 
14. /d. at 697. 
15. See, e.g., id. at 727. 
16. /d. at 727-28. 
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"allows tribes to exercise some degree of self-governance over labor rela-
tions," it is "at bottom a reactive and insufficient approach that will thwart 
the ability of tribes to develop more progressive and comprehensive labor 
policies that satisfy the specific needs of tribal communities." 17 
Because tribes are so vulnerable to the heavy hand of federal interfer-
ence, the divestiture of tribal sovereignty forces them into a defensive pos-
ture. "Once confronted with the threat of NLRA enforcement," Professor 
Singel writes, "tribes are forced to divert their attention away from the pur-
suit of a vision for community labor relations that may in fact embrace un-
ions and promote organizing activity" as part of a comprehensive tribal law 
approach to employee rights. 18 It is here that Professor Singel's voice speaks 
so thoughtfully: tribal sovereignty is important not only as a formal, digni-
tary, and remedial matter, but also because it allows tribes to engage in legal 
and institutional development according to norms that may differ from, and 
ultimately empower, citizens in their communities. 19 
Professor Singel's subsequent piece, Institutional Economics, extends 
her thinking about labor law, but shifts the focus specifically to tribal labor 
law. 20 As foreshadowed in Labor Relations, however, Professor Singel's 
thinking here transcends both doctrinal methodology and the usual pro-
tribe/pro-labor positions. While tribal sovereignty proponents do indeed 
argue for tribal solutions, Professor Singel concedes that this is a difficult 
proposition to realize on the ground in Indian country. 21 As a means of ex-
plaining why, Professor Singel turns to law and economics theory, arguing 
that "microeconomics sheds light on the dynamics of the choices that em-
ployees and union organizers make as they decide how to proceed to protect 
labor interests in Indian country." 22 
More specifically, Professor Singel brings the insights of "path de-
pendence" to explain resistance to innovation and provides a detailed subset 
of new institutional economics-based arguments for and against federal and 
tribal labor law. 23 If tribes seek to exercise sovereignty over labor matters, 
Professor Singel argues that they could apply a number of insights from 
17. /d. 
18. /d. at 728. 
19. See id. at 714-17. 
20. Singel, supra note 11, at 498-503. 
21. See id. at 500-03. 
22. /d. at 488. 
23. /d. at 491. The pro-tribal labor law efficiency arguments are: fairness, working 
conditions, cultural match, and efficiency of tribal court adjudication. /d. at 498-99. The anti-
tribal labor law efficiency arguments are underdeveloped tribal law and perceived unfairness. 
/d. at 500. The pro-federal labor efficiency arguments are: perceived fairness, stability, and 
predictability. !d. at 498. The anti-federal labor law efficiency arguments are: modern decline 
of labor unions, the archaic, inefficient quality of the NLRB, and the poorly-suited nature of 
the NLRB to Indian country regulation. /d. at 495-97. 
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new institutional economics, especially the creation of organizations and 
support of individuals with an interest in the new regime. 24 Specifically, she 
suggests that tribes consider the development of programs specifically tar-
geted toward employment, including fostering the formation of employee 
rights organizations or developing laws that recognize the claims, redress, 
and protection of employees with grievances. 25 Other suggestions focus on 
educating others, particularly non-Indian employees, about tribal legal insti-
tutions, tribal cultural and political values, and encouraging involvement in 
tribal civic and community life. 26 At the same time, she contends tribal ad-
vocates should develop the efficiencies associated with tribal jurisdiction, 
such that tribal courts truly become the fair, nimble, low-cost, close-to-
home institutions that they have the potential to be. 27 
As one of very few legal scholars to bring law and economics to bear 
on tribal labor law (or even Indian law generally)/8 Professor Singel's in-
quiry is the first into these very fruitful and important ways of bridging sov-
ereignty and labor concerns. Her capacity to incorporate these new insights 
into economic matters is also illustrated in her article, Cultural Sovereignty 
and Transplanted Law: Tensions in Indigenous Self-Rule. 29 Here, Professor 
Singel evaluates the situation of tribal governments, whose interest in fos-
tering economic development has led to the rapid adoption of commercial 
law. 30 As Professor Singe! demonstrates, some of this law reform has prov-
en dysfunctional for reasons both mechanical (tribes adopted Article 9 on 
Secured Transactions without the many other articles cross-referenced in 
Article 9) and/or cultural (the norms embedded in the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) did not necessarily reflect tribal conceptions of property 
rights). 31 
In an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of how and why tribes' 
new UCCs were so fraught with difficulty, Professor Singe! turns to com-
parative law's literature on "Law and Development."32 As she explains, in 
the 1970s many U.S. policymakers proposed the export of U.S. legal institu-
tions and rules as a step toward investment and infrastructure development 
24. !d. at 501-02. 
25. !d. at 501. 
26. !d. at 501-02. 
27. /d. at 502. 
28. Cf Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and Barriers to 
Tribal Capital Market Access, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943 (2008); Ezra Rosser, This 
Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your Land: Markets and Institutions for Economic Develop-
ment on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 245 (2005). 
29. See generally Wenona T. Singe), Cultural Sovereignty and Transplanted Law: 
Tensions in Indigenous Self-Rule, 15 KAN. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 357 (2006). 
30. !d. at 359-62. 
3 I. !d. at 361-62. 
32. !d. at 363-67. 
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in the developing world, including Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 33 Yet, 
even these original proponents later realized that they could not successfully 
impose U.S. models on nations whose infrastructure and cultural norms 
differed so substantially from that of the United States. 34 While noting con-
textual limitations of her comparison, Professor Singel insightfully draws a 
parallel between the limits of "transplanted law" in both contexts. 35 She then 
suggests employing a new model, one of "cultural sovereignty," to ensure 
that tribes take a deliberate and integrated approach to lawmaking and re-
form, including economic development. 36 
In her related work, which shifts specifically to tribal property inter-
ests, Professor Singel addresses the confounding problem of Indian land 
claims in the contemporary era. In Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 
Professor Singel and her co-author Professor Matthew Fletcher examine 
theories of equity to respond to the Supreme Court's devastating opinion in 
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, limiting the extent to which Indian 
nations can use their purchasing power to regain political sovereignty over 
reservation lands lost during the process of conquest. 37 Professors Singel 
and Fletcher note that the rules of equity fundamentally address fairness 
concerns. 38 Equitable principles such as unclean hands and relative harm 
would seemingly prohibit courts from applying laches to bar Indian 
claims. 39 To ignore these concerns in the American Indian context, they 
contend, seems to defy the very principles that animate concepts of equity 
law. 40 
But even this powerful critique, Professors Singel and Fletcher argue, 
is not the only way to conceive of the inequitable use of equity in Sherrill, a 
case that uniformly silenced the harms suffered by the American Indians 
who were "[ o ]utnumbered, outgunned, and out-brutalized" and therefore 
forced to recede in the histories giving rise to contemporary claims. 41 Sin gel 
and Fletcher contend that, in Sherrill, as with Anishinaabe claims in Michi-
gan and other Indian land-related cases across the country, seeing the equi-
ties on the non~Indian side often legitimates land dispossession through 
33. See id. at 365. 
34. /d. at 364. 
35. !d. at 367. 
36. !d. at 357-58, 362-63 (citing Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the 
Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Na-
tions, 12 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 191,209 (2001)). 
37. Wenona T. Singe! & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal 
Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21, 21-22 (2005). See generally id. (citing City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005)). 
38. See id. at 36. 
39. !d. at 48-50. 
40. /d. at 48-49. 
41. Seeid. at21,45. 
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means outside of the rule of law. 42 As the authors write, "City of Sherrill 
and its progeny ... have performed a service to the people and entities ... 
who used physical and political power to dispossess Indian people and 
communities of their lands."43 Retelling stories of Anishinaabe people who 
lost their land as a result of brutal violence and abuse of legal processes, 
Professors Singel and Fletcher challenge the notion that justice is achieved 
when courts apply equity in favor of the current owners or occupiers of In-
dian lands, to the complete exclusion of the Indian parties. 44 
While Power, Authority, and Tribal Property was published in 2006, 
it has turned out to be prescient in light of subsequent Supreme Court and 
federal appellate decisions even further denying Indian remedies for historic 
land loss.45 Thus, Professor Singe! and Fletcher's challenge to judges and 
lawmakers to stake out a "middle ground," one that applies notions of prop-
erty and equity and maintains a broader commitment to the rule of law, with 
attention to American Indian experience and history, remains vital today. 46 
Similarly, another co-authored article by Professors Singel and Fletch-
er makes the contemporary case for the use of historic treaties and treaty 
jurisprudence in the preservation and restoration of the Great Lakes today. 
In Indian Treaties and the Survival of the Great Lakes (Indian Treaties), the 
authors note that Indian treaties recognize certain tribal rights to the Great 
Lakes for economic, cultural, and political activities, all of which require 
preservation of the resource. 47 Yet, these treaties, even with their provisions 
on fishing rights and other tribal interests, have not yet been tested as a legal 
tool in the struggle to protect and restore the Great Lakes. 4R Treaties and 
treaty jurisprudence would supplement the conceptual limits of the public 
trust doctrine in favor of alternative cultural norms and, as a matter of envi-
ronmental justice, help to ensure Indian tribes have a seat at the table when 
42. !d. at 45-47. 
43. !d. at 45. 
44. See id. 
45. For one such line of cases, see Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 
277-78 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding tribe's possessory claim barred by laches and no basis for 
constructive possession that could support trespass damages); Oneida Indian Nation v. Coun-
ty of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Sherrill and Cayuga barred 
claims for redress for 250,000 acres of land taken by New York and two counties); Ononda-
ga Nation v. State, No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010 WL 3806492, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010) 
(holding that Sherrill, Cayuga, and Oneida foreclose the Onondaga claim for declaratory 
judgment recognizing tribal property rights). But see Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. 
Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL 4808823, at *22-23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2008) 
(holding Cayuga does not bar claims in this case). 
46. See Singe! & Fletcher, supra note 37, at 22-23. 
47. Wenona T. Singe! & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Treaties and the Survival of 
the Great Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1285, 1287. 
48. !d. 
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clean-up and access is negotiated. 49 Once again, as in all of Professor 
Singel's work, Indian Treaties identifies a long-standing problem-in this 
case, pollution and degradation of the Great Lakes. 50 She then evaluates the 
problem through theory-the property arguments underlying the public trust 
doctrine. 51 And finally, Professor Singel proposes a new window into solu-
tions-here, the interest convergence suggested by Indian treaty rights and 
broader community needs in cleaning up the Great Lakes. 52 
Professor Singel has a number of other publications that we could dis-
cuss. 53 But having drawn out many of what we see as the specific and gen-
eral strengths of her work, we now move on to her current piece, Indian 
Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, which is also the subject of this 
symposium. 54 In this piece, Professor Singel argues that tribal governments 
should be externally accountable to a system of human rights law that en-
sures individual citizens and community members are fairly and humanely 
treated under the law. 55 Consistent with her previous work, Professor Singel 
draws from theory, this time political theory, to argue that while tribes re-
tain certain sovereign prerogatives of noninterference from other govern-
ments, they are also bound by contemporary norms that call for accountabil-
ity to tribal members. 56 In this regard, she argues that tribal governments, 
like all governments, should be held to meaningful standards with respect to 
their treatment of individual community members in citizenship, employ-
ment, social welfare, economic development, and other matters. 57 
Also consistent with her previous work, Professor Singel insists that 
the development of tribal human rights systems should empower and ema-
nate from tribal communities themselves. To advance these norms, she calls 
for a consent-based system grounded in tribal law, both procedural and sub-
stantive. She points, for example, to existing models of intertribal confeder-
acies and coalitions, in which tribes have historically joined voluntarily for 
the resolution of common conflicts. She also suggests indigenous traditions 
standards, such as the Seven Grandfather Teachings of the Anishinaabe, that 
provide a basis for the development of a human rights system that could be 
used by tribes sharing cultural norms. 58 
49. See id. at 1293-95. 
50. !d. at 1286. 
51. !d. at 1287-91. 
52. !d. at 1291-93. 
53. See, e.g., FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30 (Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singe! & Kathryn E. Fort eds., 2009). 
54. See Singe!, supra note I, at 570 (arguing for the creation of an intertribal human 
rights regime to address human rights violations among tribe members). 
55. !d. at 570, 591-93. 
56. /d. at 570-83. 
57. /d. at 584-85. 
58. /d. at 568-85; 591-93; 617-22. 
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In this respect, Professor Singe! masterfully stakes out a mediated po-
sition to those who call for, respectively, increased federal court interven-
tion into internal tribal affairs, or even other external methods of accounta-
bility that have been proposed, such as the creation of an intertribal court 
system or direct accountability for the United States under international law 
for wrongs committed by tribal governments. In contrast to these proposals, 
Professor Singe! draws on earlier works in which she has turned to tribal 
law and indigenous justice systems to advocate, instead, for the creation of 
an intertribal treaty-based institution recognizing and enforcing tribal hu-
man rights obligations. 59 
To be sure, there are legitimate concerns associated with a project so 
potentially transformative as Professor Singel's. At the symposium, com-
mentators noted that, on a pragmatic level, tribal leaders may fear the pro-
posal's effect on tribal sovereignty, 60 lack the time and resources to devote 
attention to this long-term project versus other tribal needs, 61 or feel that 
their tribal laws and institutions already respect individual rights. 62 These 
comments engendered useful conversations, notably including tribal leader 
Eva Petoskey's commentary about human rights violations that she has ex-
perienced in tribal communities and her sense that reform of the kind Pro-
fessor Singe! suggests could begin in conversations among Odawa citizens 
and leaders. 63 Professor Singe! embraced these comments and addressed the 
need to bridge the theoretical and practical appeal of her proposal through 
thoughtful community discussions and governance. 64 
59. /d.at611-12. 
60. John E. Echohawk, Exec. Dir., Native Am. Rights Fund, Practitioners Perspec-
tive and Human Rights, Presentation at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: Indian 
Tribes and Human Rights Accountability (Oct. 4, 2012) (recording on file with Michigan 
State Law Review). 
61. Stacy Leeds, Dean, Univ. of Ark. Sch. of Law, Accountability, Tribal Law, and 
Human Rights, Presentation at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: Indian Tribes 
and Human Rights Accountability (Oct. 4, 2012) (recording on file with Michigan State Law 
Review). 
62. Trent Crable, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe, Practitioners 
Perspective and Human Rights, Presentation at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: 
Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability (Oct. 4, 2012) (recording on file with Mich-
igan State Law Review). 
63. Eva Petoskey, Dir., Anishnaabek Healing Circle at Inter-Tribal Council of 
Mich., Human Rights and Reparative Justice, Presentation at the Michigan State Law Re-
view Symposium: Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability (Oct. 5, 2012) (recording 
on file with Michigan State Law Review). 
64. Wenona T. Singel, Professor, Mich. State Univ. Coli. of Law, Closing Remarks 
at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accounta-
bility (Oct. 5, 2012) (recording on file with Michigan State Law Review). 
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II. TRIBAL RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
Our engagement with Professor Singel's proposal, particularly its res-
onance with current debates in international human rights law and American 
Indian tribal law, has inspired us to examine in more detail a specific ques-
tion raised by her work: that is, Professor Singel's normative suggestion that 
indigenous peoples should embrace the concept of "human rights accounta-
bility" and should effectuate it through their own laws, both procedural and 
substantive. 65 
As we prepared our response to Professor Singel's article, we began to 
look closely at the numerous ways in which indigenous peoples themselves 
are interacting with, defining, and, in some cases, embracing and concomi-
tantly shaping the body of law we refer to as "indigenous peoples' human 
rights." The result has been an exciting development in our scholarship to-
ward the research and drafting of a forthcoming work, The Jurisgenerative 
Moment in Indigenous Human Rights, which we briefly sketch out in this 
symposium Article. 66 
In our forthcoming article, taking an approach that is largely descrip-
tive rather than empirical or normative, we consider the ways in which 
American Indian tribes now find themselves as empowered architects of a 
multifaceted "human rights culture."67 Indeed, we contend we are witness-
ing a demonstrable, transformative moment in which human rights manifest 
in multiple sources of law, institutions, and discussions with relevance to 
Indian country. 68 Just as newly adopted instruments such as the United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples strengthen indigenous 
claims against nation-states for the protection of land, resources, religion, 
and dignity, so too does the human rights culture inspire indigenous com-
munities to look inward and begin to uncover, revitalize, and apply their 
own conceptions of justice and freedom to contemporary problems. 
This inquiry has taken us down several fascinating and yet-unexplored 
paths. First, we are in the process of examining the role of indigenous con-
ceptions of justice, both as they relate to tribal legal systems and also as 
they have increasingly been incorporated into international human rights 
law and in the drafting of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in particular. 69 Foundational to this research is the question of how 
65. Singe I, supra note I, at 608. 
66. Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, The Jurisgenerative Moment in Indige-
nous Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
67. See Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2029, 2049 (2003). 
68. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can Self-
Determination Be Actualized Within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 923 (2011). 
69. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 {Sept. 13, 2007). 
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indigenous cosmologies inform substantive norms and conceptions of rights 
and responsibilities in tribal communities. Thus, indigenous peoples' no-
tions of justice serve as the core foundation for this project. 
We are also exploring multiple additional avenues of intersection 
within indigenous human rights, with a particular focus on the ways in 
which tribes are using the somewhat nascent body of international indige-
nous human rights law to inform their own internal lawmaking and adjudi-
catory systems. We have uncovered numerous examples to demonstrate the 
phenomenon, including tribal constitutions and codes manifesting human 
rights language, 70 tribal court opinions relying on international law, 71 and 
the creation of human rights bodies within tribal communities that are de-
signed to specifically deal with indigenous peoples' human rights con-
cerns. 72 Just as strikingly, we have discovered that these interactions with 
indigenous human rights are surfacing again in the international human 
rights cases themselves. These cases increasingly reflect tribal conceptions 
of dignity and justice and reaffirm the rights of indigenous peoples "to have 
rights"73 under international law. 74 
70. See, e.g., LIITLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF 0DAWA CONST. art. VI ("We, the 
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, speak through this document to assert that we 
are a distinct nation of Anishinaabek of North America that possess the right to: self-
determination; freely determine our political status; freely pursue our economic, social, reli-
gious and cultural development, and determine our membership, without external interfer-
ence. These same rights and principles the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians 
acknowledge to be inherent among other peoples, nations and governments throughout the 
world. We recognize their sovereignty and pledge to maintain relations with those peoples, 
nations and governments who acknowledge those same fundamental human rights and prin-
ciples, and who recognize the sovereignty of the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indi-
ans."); NORTHERN ARAPAHO CODE, 7 N.A.C. 401 (describing grounds for an order terminat-
ing peacemaking process as "[c]onduct by the Peacemaker in the peacemaking process which 
is degrading, inhuman, dangerous, assaultive or otherwise violative of basic human rights"). 
71. E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 2005 WL 6437828, at *7 (E. Cherokee 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 2005) (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and other international decisions and instruments in support of Eastern 
Cherokee tribal court jurisdiction over crime committed by citizen of Mexico); In re Custody 
of T.M., 3 Am. Tribal Law 485, 487 (Navajo 2001) (citing the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in support of child's right to be heard in a custody case); Selana v. Hualapai Tribe, 
Appellate Court Case No.: 2008-AP-005 (Hualapai Court of Appeals 2008) (considering 
international norms on treatment of minor witnesses). 
72. See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 921 (2009) (creating the Navajo Human 
Rights Commission "to operate as a clearinghouse entity to administratively address discrim-
inatory actions against citizens of the Navajo Nation, and to interface with the local, state, 
and federal governments and with national and international human rights organizations in 





See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 298 (195 I). 
See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. 
No. 11,577 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.escr-
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What we observe, then, might be described-in the words of Robert 
Cover-as a "jurisgenerative" moment in indigenous human rights, wherein 
tribal people draw from multiple legal sources to create and renew legal 
meanings that allow them to flourish as vital and separate peoples. 75 In this 
regard, we argue that tribes are neither resisting international human rights 
law nor being overpowered by it. Rather, they are embracing and becoming 
empowered by international law, using their own tribal laws, substantive 
and procedural, as a means to digest, interpret, and apply the concept of 
human rights today. 76 
In some ways, this forthcoming project is critique-driven. That is, we 
desire to engage critics from two opposite perspectives: one contending that 
international human rights law improperly defers to (or even elevates) col-
lective tribal autonomy over the individual rights ofmembers77 and the oth-
er arguing that if international human rights law does impose liability on 
tribes, 78 this represents another instance of forced assimilation, requiring 
net.org/sites/default/files/seriec _79 _ing_ O.pdf (emphasizing indigenous land values and 
customary land tenure in recognition of property rights). 
75. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 15-
16 (1983) ("Thus it is that the very act of constituting tight communities about common 
ritual and law is jurisgenerative by a process of juridical mitosis. New law is constantly 
created through the sectarian separation of communities. The 'Torah' becomes two, three, 
many Toroth as surely as there are teachers to teach or students to study. The radical instabil-
ity of the paideic nomos forces intentional communities-communities whose members 
believe themselves to have common meanings for the normative dimensions of their com-
mon lives-to maintain their coherence as paideic entities by expulsion and exile of the 
potent flowers of normative meaning."). 
76. Cf id. at 16 ("The paideic is an etude on the theme of unity. Its primary psycho-
logical motif is attachment. The unity of every paideia is being shattered-shattered, in fact, 
with its very creation. The imperial is an etude on the theme of diversity. Its primary psycho-
logical motif is separation. The diversity of every such world is being consumed from its 
onset by domination. Thus, as the meaning in a nomos disintegrates, we seek to rescue it-to 
maintain some coherence in the awesome proliferation of meaning lost as it is created-by 
unleashing upon the fertile but weakly organized jurisgenerative cells an organizing principle 
itself incapable of producing the normative meaning that is life and growth."). 
77. See Rebecca Gross, The "!" in Indigenous: Enforcing Individual Rights Guar-
antees in an Indigenous Group Rights Context, 23 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 65, 67-68 (2010); see 
also Austin Badger, Comment, Collective v. Individual Human Rights in Membership Gov-
ernance for Indigenous Peoples, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 485, 501-10 (2011) (arguing the 
UNDRIP fails to set forth a standard of review for tribes' membership decisions). 
78. See, e.g., Clare Boronow, Note, Closing the Accountability Gap for Indian 
Tribes: Balancing the Right to Self-Determination with the Right to a Remedy, 98 VA. L. 
REv. 1373, 1410-16 (2012) (considering whether, despite lack of formal liability for nonstate 
actors under classic approaches to international law, tribes may still be accountable to vari-
ous international human rights laws, through liability devolving from states, a more capa-
cious approach to international legal personality, and/or because they are persons or entities 
who enjoy certain rights and duties as a matter of customary international law); see also 
Robert J. Miller, Inter-Tribal and International Treaties for American Indian Economic 
Development, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1103, 1118-19 (2008) (considering whether Indian 
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tribes to meet foreign standards of Western liberalism that are antithetical to 
tribal values. 79 
While fully recognizing that several scholars raise legitimate and 
pressing concerns, we assert that these critiques are overly rigid, suggesting 
dichotomies and hierarchies80 where tribes are taking more progressive, 
integrative approaches. 81 Indeed, from examples we have been able to un-
cover in support of our thesis, we have formed a different or at least com-
plementary viewpoint. We observe that in some instances, tribes are work-
ing to foster individual and collective interests, legal rights and social rela-
tionships, and oral traditions and written laws. As a counterpoint to leading 
critiques, then, The Jurisgenerative Moment will demonstrate that indige-
nous peoples are deeply and consciously involved in architecting a human 
rights moment that bridges Western and indigenous ideals, mechanisms, and 
outcomes. 82 Just as tribes deploy human rights law to support claims for 
natural resources, religious freedoms, and equality against the United States, 
they are also using the language and instruments of human rights to inspire 
tribes might be bound by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, or the World Trade Organization). 
79. See generally, Elvira Pulitano, Indigenous Rights and International Law: An 
Introduction, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION I, 6 (Elvira Puli-
tano ed., 2012); H. Patrick Glenn, The Three Ironies of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 171, 171 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) (arguing 
that when indigenous peoples "demand recognition for alternative ways of understanding the 
world," they do so "ironically enough ... in the idiom of Western culture theory" (citing 
Adam Kuper, The Return of the Native, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 389, 395 (2003))); 
Natalie Baird, To Ratify or Not to RatifY? An Assessment of the Case for Ratification of In-
ternational Human Rights Treaties in the Pacific, 12 MELB. J. INT'L L. 249,263 (2011) (con-
sidering the claim that human rights are perceived as "foreign" in certain Pacific regions); 
Guillermo de Ia Pena, Ethnographies of Indigenous Exclusion in Western Mexico, 18 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 307, 317-19 (2011) (describing apparent tension between cultural 
integrity and individual rights in certain Western Mexican communities); see also Austen 
Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the Development of Indigenous 
Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 291, 312 (2007) (suggesting that Western supporters of indig-
enous human rights may become disenchanted with indigenous groups who insist on the 
right to group autonomy at the expense of individual rights). 
80. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 77, at 68 (arguing that "certain fundamental individ-
ual rights must supersede the indigenous peoples' collective right to self-determination"). 
81. Cf Boronow, supra note 78, at 1420-25 (suggesting tribes embrace duties as 
articulated in international human rights instruments, either through self-enforcement or 
independent tribunals). 
82. For one nuanced account of the challenges of reconciling human rights and 
indigenous traditions in property claims, see, e.g., Joel Wainwright & Joe Bryan, Cartog-
raphy, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in 
Nicaragua and Belize, 16 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES 153, !54 (2009) (arguing that assertion 
of property rights, including through legal and cartographic strategies, in international human 
rights cases both "confronts a racist and exclusionary colonial past" and "reinforces differ-
ences and inequalities in the colonial present"). 
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internal reflection on tribal governance. In this process, they have actively 
and thoughtfully integrated international human rights norms with tribal law 
norms, and, in some cases, used the discourse of human rights to uncover 
and revitalize their own indigenous legal traditions. 83 
The Juris generative Moment, then, is a direct outgrowth of the inquiry 
inspired by Professor Singel's work. And, in many ways, its descriptive 
approach parallels-and perhaps even supports-her normative proposal for 
the development of an indigenous, treaty-based dispute resolution mecha-
nism within the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Singel's scholarly career to date, and especially Indian 
Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, has elevated discourse in Ameri-
can Indian law by identifying thorny problems on the ground, embracing 
legal theory as a conceptual tool, and proposing tribal law solutions to tribal 
law problems. In this regard, she has pushed others to go further in their 
work. With respect to human rights, Professor Singel has inspired us to 
reexamine the ascendant critiques that would dichotomize human rights and 
tribal rights as incompatible, either because human rights immunize tribes 
or dominate them. Through the theoretical lens of the "juris generative" legal 
process, 84 we assert that tribes are now acting as empowered architects in 
the global human rights culture, working to improve the lives of their mem-
bers through a vital interpretive process. We look forward to continued dia-
logue on this project with our valued colleague Professor Singel and others 
in the field. 
83. Cf JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS 
LAw xii (2002) ("[T]he power of Aboriginal law can still be discerned despite the pervasive-
ness of imported law."); JOHN BORROWS, CANADA'S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION 23-55 
(20 10) (describing sources and categories of indigenous law including sacred, natural, delib-
erative, positivistic, and customary); RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO 
COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE xvii (2009) ("There is a unique 
side to tribal court jurisprudence in the United States ... [that] involves retrieving ancient 
tribal values, customs, and norms and using them to solve contemporary legal issues and 
tribal problems. The modem Navajo Nation courts are adept at this way of problem solving. 
This method is itself a lesson embedded in the Navajo Creation Scripture and Journey Narra-
tives. These narratives are the Navajo people's oral history beginning with the primeval 
universe."). 
84. Cover, supra note 75, at 15-16. 
